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FREEDOM OF CONTRACT

T

HE liberty mentioned in the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Federal Constitution "means not only the right
of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of
his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to
embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment
of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful
ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood
by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which
may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out
to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned."
This was written by MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM in Aflgeyer v.

Louisina' where it was held that a state statute prohibiting
in effect a contract of insurance with a company resident in
a foreign state of the Union was unconstitutional.
In Ritchie v. People2 a similar conclusion was reached from
another point of view. This case involved the constitutionality of an act of the Legislature prohibiting the employment of females in any factory or workshop more than
eight hours in any one day. The statute was held to be unconstitutional as an arbitrary restriction upon the fundamental right of the citizen to control his or her own time
and faculties in a matter in which employer and employee
are equally competent to agree. The act of the Legislature was defended as a proper exercise of the police
power of the state but the court held that the Legislature
could not evade constitutional limitations by an arbitrary
exercise of the police power and that the final determination of a question involving the constitutional rights of the
individual was for the courts. In his opinion, MACGRUDER J.,
said, speaking of the constitutional guaranty that no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law, "The privilege of contracting is both a
liberty and a property right * * * and when an owner is

deprived of one of the attributes of property, like the right
to make contracts, he is deprived of his property within
the meaning of the Constitution."
This is a very plain and elementary doctrine. So much
168 U. S, 578.
(1895) 165 Ill. 98. Contra (1876) Commonwealth v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 120
Mass. 383, cited approvingly in Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 3a6, 395.
1 (1896)
2
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so that it may be of interest to observe its vicissitudes before our courts during recent years. The true condition of
things is very well put by CULLEN, C. J., in People v. Grout 3 :
"I fear that the many outrages of labor organizations, or
some of their members, have not only excited just indignation but at times have frightened courts into plain legal inconsistencies, and into the enunciation of doctrines, which,
if asserted in litigations arising under any other subject
than labor legislation would meet scant courtesy or consideration."
In the case of People v. Grout, the Comptroller of the City
of New York resisted payment of a contract for the construction of ten scows for the city, on the ground that the
contractor had violated the "Labor Law," providing that
no laborer, workman or mechanic should be required to
work more than eight hours in any one calendar day, except
in the case of, extraordinary emergency. Payment was
resisted on the sole ground that the relator had permitted
his workmen to work for more than eight hours a day. In
his contract with the city the relator had agreed to comply
with the provisions of the "Labor Law." It was held by
a majority of the court that this failure to observe the
labor law was not such a breach of contract as would 'entitle the city to refuse payment after the scows had been
delivered to and accepted by the city. It was also held
that the statute was unconstitutional in that to enforce it
in this case would violate the constitutional guarantees for
the protection and security of private property and the
sacredness of contracts.
This case may be compared with Atkin v. Kansas" as
bearing on the subject of
Contracts With Municipalities.
There can be no doubt but that the state, for itself or its
municipalities, mere agents of the state for most purposes,
may by general law specify the terms upon which it will
contract with parties. There is no principle of local selfgovernment involved. 5 In Atkin v. Kansas the state had
passed a statute known as the eight-hour law. It was
made applicable only to persons engaged in the performance of work for the state or some municipality of the
* (1904) 72 N. E. Rep. 464, 467.
* (1903) 191 U. S. 207.
'Williams v. Eggleston (1897) 170 U. S. 304.

inIra.

But see Ryan v. City of New York,
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state. The law made any officer of the state or municipality or any contractor violating the law, liable to fine and
imprisonment. The court held that the law was not unconstitutional as an unauthorized interference with the right
of contract. JUSTICE HARLAN said: "We rest our decision
upon the broad ground that the work being of a public
character, absolutely under the control of the state and its
municipal agents acting by its authority, it is for the state
to prescribe the conditions under which it will permit work
of that kind to be done. Its action touching such a matter
is final so long as it does not, by its regulations, infringe the
personal rights of others; and that it has not done."
In the forepart of the same opinion JUSTICE HARLAN also said:
"Whether a similar statute, applied to laborers or employees in purely private work would be constitutional, is
a question of very large import, which we have no occasion now to determine or even consider."
The cases of Atkin v. Kansas and People v. Grout can not be
reconciled without difficulty, nor can they be satisfactorily
distinguished. Both were, indirectly, contracts with the
state and involved the expenditure of moneys, raised
through the power of taxation. In the Grout case the city
had received and accepted the property of relator and in
equity and good conscience ought to pay for it, notwithstanding the statute, but in the Atkin case the respondent had been
deprived of his personal liberty. The right of property is
no more sacred than the right of personal liberty. While
there is a clear distinction in contracts between individuals
and contracts between an individual and the state, still
neither class of cases calls for an invasion of constitutional
rights. It may be said fairly that the state has the right to
dictate by law the terms on which it will directly or indirectly become a party to a contract and may punish its
agents or others for the offense of making contracts in
violation of such laws and may enforce the observance of
the law by imposing a penalty for its violation. Perhaps
this was all that was intended by the Atkin decision, but it
has been misinterpreted and carried much further, and
has been urged as authority for all kinds of paternal legislation in the interest of various organizations. 6
Some courts have declined to recognize any importdnt
distinction between contracts between the individual and
the state and purely private contracts.
6

See O'Brien T. in People v. Grout (1904)

72 N. E. 468.
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In Ryan v. City of New York 7 the Labor Law of the state
provided that the wages to be paid for a legal day's work
to all classes of laborers upon any public work "shall not be
ldss than the prevailing rate for a day's work" in the locality where the work is performed. The validity of the
statute was called in question as being an unconstitutional
interference with the right of contract. The court, PARKER,
C. J., rendering the opinion, sustained the law, holding that,
so far as it relates to the direct employees of the state or of a
municipality thereof, it is constitutional. HAIGHT, CULLEN
and WERNER, JJ., concurred, but O'BRIEN, J., wrote a dissenting opinion, concurred in by BARTLETT and VANN, JJ., in
which he said that "There can be no sound distinction in
the application of the statute to the direct and immediate
employees of a city and the case of an independent contractor who has not observed the law." s He calls the distinction "fanciful" and insists that the case is covered by
the Rodgers case, 9 in which he, writing the prevailing opinion, said: "The people of the state at large, through their
representatives, have no more authority to dictate to a
city the form in which its contracts shall be framed or the
wages that it shall pay to laborers than they have to dictate to an individual what he shall eat, drink or. wear."' 10
The case of Rodger" v. Coler is one of the first of the New
York cases bearing on labor legislation, and in it the power
of the Legislature to regulate wages of those employed
upon the public work of a municipality is discussed. Rodgers
as relator asked for a mandamus to compel the city of
New York to pay him for regulating and grading a street,
a local improvement, the expense of which was ultimately
to be charged to and paid by the local property owners.
The work had been properly performed and certificates of
completion issued by the proper officer. The city defended on the ground that the relator had, in executing his contract of construction, violated the Labor Law in that he had
not paid "his workmen not less than the prevailing rate of
wages in the locality" as the law required and as he had
agreed to do in his contract. It appears that at the time
the decision was rendered there were pending against
the city in consequence of alleged violations of the statute
in question, claims aggregating over six million dollars,
7 (1904)
8 (1904)
9 (1901)
10 (1901)
struction Co.

177 N. Y. 271.
177 N. Y. 271, 281.
166 N. Y. 1.
166 N. Y. 20. Approved in City of Cleveland v. The Clements Bros. Con(1902), 67 Ohio St. 197.
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representing the difference in the amount actually paid
by the city to its employees and what was assumed to be
the prevailing rate of wages under the statute. The statute was held to be unconstitutional because it invaded the
rights of liberty and property in that it denied to the city
and the contractor the right to agree with their employees
upon the measure of their compensation. The prevailing
opinion draws a distinction between the governmental capacity and the business capacity of the city and holds that in its
business capacity it makes local improvements and has the
same freedom of contract as the individual. This doctrine
is most certainly at variance with the law as announced in
Atkin v. Kansas.11
As bearing on the power of the Legislature to prescribe the
terms upon which individuals shall contract with the state
or in its behalf the Michigan case, Kuhn v. Detroit,12 may be
referred to. The relator applied for a mandamus to compel respondent, the City of Detroit, to approve of a liquor
dealer's bond, executed by him with two sureties and filed
with the common council of the city to enable him to comply with the state law licensing the sale of intoxicating
liquors. The respondent answered that the bond did not
comply with the statute in that the sureties had not properly justified; that they had not in their affidavit of justification sworn that they "were not engaged either as principal, agent, or servant, in the sale. of any liquors mentioned
in this Act." The fact was, they were engaged in the manufacture of liquors but were not retail dealers or saloon
keepers. The city council disapproved the bond. The
court held that the statute was unconstitutional in that it
violated both the state and the Federal Constitution providing that "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law;" that the right to
contract a debt or to become surety for another was a property right; that the law was also in conflict with the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States
in that it made unjust and illegal discrimination between
persons in similar circumstances, and the case of Yick Wo v.
Hopkins 3 is cited and relied on. It should be noted, however, that the Yick Wo case involved the validity of a city
ordinance making it unlawful to carry on a laundry business
'4

(1903)

191 U.

S. 207.

(1888) 70 Mich. 534.
= (1886) 118 U. S. 356.
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anywhere in the city of San Francisco without first having
obtained the consent of the board of supervisors, unless"the
laundry was located in a brick or stone building. The case
did not involve the right of contract and is not authority for
the doctrine announced in the Michigan case, which holds
in effect that a state can not dictate the terms upon which
it is willing to become a party to a contract; that the state
may require a bond but can not prescribe the qualifications
of the sureties, can not say that the principal and surety
shall not be engaged in the same or similar lines of business. This is carrying the freedom of contract beyond well
recognized limitations.
The foregoing cases with others14 that might be stated
leave the principle that the state may dictate the terms
upon which it will contract with the individual of doubtful application. The line of demarkation in this respect
between the legislative functions and the business functions
of a municipality is very dim and sometimes overlooked.
Freedom of contract is, by some courts, considerably restricted, as in the Atkin case, and wholly unbridled as in the
Michigan case. The New York doctrine, if we can tell
what it is, seems to approach nearer to the constitutional
guarantees of the citizen.
Contracts Between Individuals
The right of contract as between individuals is no less
uncertain than as between the individual and the state. It
is conceded that this right as pertaining to private property
or personal liberty is guaranteed by the Constitution of the
state and of the nation but what limitations may be placed
upon its free enjoyment present troublesome questions before the courts.
Where persons are incapacitated from giving complete
assent to a contract by reason of age or infirmity or artificiality of construction or where the contract itself is of such a nature that the making of it would be detrimental to the public
generally, then there is little doubt of the right and duty
of the legislature to regulate or prohibit. Within this field
public policy has full control, but beyond it the Constitution
stands to protect the citizen in his natural rights.
"Every person sui juris has the right to make use of his
labor in any lawful employment on his own behalf or to
I'

People v. Featherstonhaugh, 172 N.

Y. 112; Loan Ass'n V. Topeka, 87 U.

Board of' Education v. Blodgett, 155 Ill. 441; Clark v. State, 142 N.
Smyth, 22 Wash. 327.

S. 655;

Y. 101; Seattle v.
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hire it out in the service of others."' 15

The right of con-

tract can not be interfered with on the pretense of public
good when the general public is in no way affected by the
contract. This is a necessary limitation on the much
abused police power of the state.
In Godcharles v. Wigeman'0 the plaintiff had been employed as a puddler by the defendants in their rail mills.
During his employment plaintiff asked for and received
from defendants what were known as store orders in payment for his wages. A statute of the state prohibited the
giving of store orders in payment for labor. The court
held the statute to be unconstitutional for that the Legislature had attempted by the act to do what, in this country,
can not be done; that is, prevent persons who are sui juris
from making their own contracts. Mr. JUSTICE GORDON, delivering the opinion of the court, said: "The act is an infringement alike of the rights of the employer and the employee; more than this it is an insulting attempt to put the
laborer under alegislative tutelage, which is not only degrading to his manhood, but subversive of his rights as a
citizen of the United States. He may sell his labor for
what he thinks best, whether money or goods, just as his
employer may sell his iron or coal, and any and every law
that proposes to prevent him from so doing is an infringeprivileges, and consequently viment of his constitutional
17
cious and void.'
To the same effect is the holding of the Supreme Court
of the State of Illinois in Frorer v. The People.'8 An act
known as the "Truck Store" act was before the court. It
provided for the payment of wages in lawful money and
prohibited the truck system. An action of debt was brought
to recover a penalty of $50 for violation of the statute. It
was held that the statute was an unauthorized interference
with the freedom of contract; that the privilege of contracting is both a liberty and a property right and that the owners of coal mines (to which the act applied) could not be
prohibited from making contracts which it is competent
for other owners of property or employers of labor to make.

Cooley
3 (1886)
27 (1886)
1s (1892)
25

on Torts, 326.
113 Pa. St. 431. See Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison (1901), 183 U. S. 13.
113 Pa. St. 431, 437.
141 Ill. 171, followed in Kellyville Coal Co. v. Harrier, 207, Ill. 624. To the

same effect is State v. Goodwill,

33 W. Va. 179.
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In Commonwealth v. Perry,19 an act prohibited the imposing of a fine by an employer upon his employee, engaged in
weaving, for imperfections in work was before the court.
A contract had been made under regulations permitting
such fine imposed to secure faithfulness and accuracy. The
court held the act unconstitutional, saying: "The right to
employ weavers, and to make proper contracts with them,
is therefore protected by our Constitution; and a statute
which forbids the making of such contracts, or attempts to
nullify them, or impair the obligation of them, violates fundamental principles of right which are expressly recognized in our Constitution."
In Braceville Coal Co. v. The People,20 an act providing for
weekly payment of wages by corporations and prohibiting
the making of contracts in violation thereof was held unconstitutional, in that it deprived the citizen of his constitutional right to contract.
While there are a few cases to the contrary the foregoing fairly illustrate the weight of authority in this country.
Free locomotion is of primary importance in personal liberty, but without freedom of contract the life of the individual would scarcely be worth living. It would be unfortunate indeed, if the right of contract in the individuAl were
not protected by constitutional guarantees against various
legislative notions regarding, public policy and the police
power of the state.
Police Power of the State.
The right of contract is possessed and enjoyed subject to
the police power of the state. This power has never been
defined and its relation to freedom of contract is imperfectly understood. It certainly includes the power of the
state to protect itself by legislation and under it contracts
which tend to defeat the ends of government or are manifestly prejudicial to the interests of the whole people may
well be prohibited. Beyond this very little can be said
that is satisfactory. In a recent case, in speaking of the
liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth
10 (1891) 155 Mass. 117. Contra, Hancock v. Yaden, 121 Ind. 366. In this case the
court held, ELLIOT J. writing, that a statute prohibiting a contract being made in advance, waiving the right to receive money in the payment of wages and agreeing to
receive merchandise, is constitutional, does not unlawfully interfere with the right of
contract. Such contracts "the legislature may prohibit in order to protect and maintain
the lawful money of the nation." Why not for the same reason prohibit all contracts
of sale and barter and make legal tender money the only medium of exchange? Neither
the nation nor the individual is in neod of any such protecting care from the state at
the expense of freedom of contract.
- (1893) 147 Ill. 66. See also Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison (1901), 183 U. S. 13.
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Amendment of the Federal Constitution, Mr. JUSTICE PECKHAM said: "Thee are, however, certain powers, existing
in the sovereignty of each state in the Union, somewhat
vaguely termed police powers, the exact description and
limitation of which have not been attempted by the courts.
The powers broadly stated and without, at present, any
attempt at a more specific limitation, relate to the safety,
health, morals and general welfare of the public. Both
property and liberty are held on such reasonable conditions
as may be imposed by the governing power of the state
in the exercise of these powers, and with such conditions
the Fourteenth amendment was not designed to interfere.
(Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623)."
These police powers have been used so extensively during the past few years, in defense of all kinds of legislation, restraining the freedom of contract, that individual
rights in the matter appear to have only a theoretical value.
So called labor legislation, limiting the hours of labor that
may be contracted for in any one day or week, is most
common. This is generally done under the claim that such
legislation is in protection of

The Public Health.
There has been no doubt but that the state may pass laws
in preservation of the public health. The constitutional
guarantees of the individual do not abridge the power of
the state to do this. Of this class of legislation are laws
for compulsory vaccination, 21 and limiting the hours of
labor in all underground mines, 22 or in any other employment which of itself is injurious to health. State Legislatures have recently gone far beyond the limitation of these
cases and have attempted to do under the guise of protecting public health some amusing things. None more so
than acts passed forming examining boards for horseshoers.
A statute of this kind came before the Supreme Court of
New York in the caqe of People v. Beattie.2 The statute
was passed to regulate the trade of horseshoeing and prohibited the practicing the business of horseshoeing without
obtaining a certificate from a board of examiners. It was
held that the law had no relation to the public health and
Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905), 197 U. S. 11.
Holden v. Hardy (1898), 169 U. S. 366.
1 (1904) 89 N. Y. Supp. 193, cited approvingly in People v. Lochner, infra. A
similar statute relating to horseshoers was held unconstitutional in In re Aubry (1904),
78 Pac. R. 900; Bessette v. People, 193 Ill. 334.
21
22
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was unconstitutional, as an arbitrary interference with personal liberty and private property without due process of
law. In support of the law it was urged that it was passed
to protect cruelty to animals, a very proper subject of legislation. The court, however, did not accept this view.
HATCH, J., said: "Doubtless the shoeing of a horse at times
may have produced corns, contracted the feet, and otherwise inflicted pain, but the same thing is true in the shoeing of human beings," and neither one subject nor the other
has ever been deemed to be sufficiently aggravated to call
for legislation.
On the other hand, in the case of State v. Zeno,24 it was
held that a statute providing for a board of examiners of
barbers and prohibiting any person from following the
occupation of a barber without obtaining a license from
this board was a constitutional exercise of the police power
of the state in the interest of the public health. If this
decision is to be followed, are we not talfing the subject too
seriously, or are we making it the scape goat for all kinds
of doubtful legislation in estal~lishing state boards, not for
health protection, but simply to give politicians a place and
at the same time to hamper and restrict competition in
those ordinary pursuits which should be open and free to
every citizen? The personal liberty guaranteed by the
Constitution is not something purely scientific, not appreciable through the common understanding of those supposed to enjoy its blessings.
The mistake arises from presupposing that the occupation of a barber has any such relation to the public health
as calls for a drastic remedy through the police power of
the state.
It is urged in support of the law that it is a matter of
common knowledge that, through inexperienced or uneducated barbers, diseases of the face are communicated to
the innocent victims, who are willing to be shaved by unlicensed barbers and the state ought to prevent this, and
all for the good of the public. It is not contended that the
steel razor is in danger of being inoculated but simply that
it may become infected by contact. So may the barber's
chair and many other things in and out the shop. All that
is needed is ordinary cleanliness, which can not be secured
through any board of examiners, sitting as experts in the
art of shaving. If a person afflicted with a contagious or
2

(1900)

79 Minn. 80.
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infectious disease goes into a shop to be shaved punish him
and not the unsuspecting barberby requiring of him that
he pass an examination before some board, or stand punishment, for following an ordinary avocation of life.
If it be contended that this board may insist upon the
licensee showing at the examination more than ordinary
proficiency in detecting the presence of infectious diseases,
then carry the law to its logical conclusion and insist, that
only those who have received a scientific education in the
diagnosis of diseases shall be permitted to follow the calling of a barber. Reductio ad absurdum. If there be any
personal liberty left to the village blacksmith, the barber
and the baker after the contending social forces have spent
their fury, may the Lord temper the wind to the shorn lamb.
We may observe that the profession of barber is of great
antiquity. "And then, son of man, take thee a barber's
razor and cause it to pass upon thine head and upon thy
beard." Ezek. v.i. Times have changed since the days of
the prophets, but it is doubtful whether the state can, even
now, be justified in keeping its citizens away from contamination of unlicensed barbers. Whither are we drifting
over these new seas of paternalism?
In Templar v. Board of Examiners of Barbers,25 the relator
asked for a mandamus to compel the state board to permit
him to take the examination provided for by law. The
board had refused to examine him upon the ground that he
was an alien. The statute provided that a certificate of examination should not be given an alien. This proviso was held to
be unconstitutional, because it denied to a resident alien the
equal protection of our laws. The right to contract and the
right to pursue an ordinary calling without legislative interference through the police power of the state were not before the court for consideration and the sanction of the law
was not in the crucible. If it had been, the decision might
have been otherwise and in accord with the recent decision
of the Supreme
Court of the United States in relation to
26
bakers.
The power of the state to license occupations requiring
police protection, or extra hazardous occupations, or to establish boards of examiners over the recognized professions in scientific education, is unquestioned. This may
well be done under the police power of the state, but before
going further we may well refer to the fundamentals in
(1902)

131 Mich. 254.

But see Ex parte Daniel Lucas (1900), 160 Mo. 218.
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constitutional government.

"The general rule undoubtedly is, that any person is at
liberty to pursue any lawful calling, and to do so in his own
way, not encroaching upon the rights of others. This general right can not be taken away. It is not competent,
therefore, to forbid any persons or class of persons, whether
citizens or resident aliens, offering their services in lawful
business, or to subject others to penalties for employing

them." 27
Perhaps the most important of recent cases on this subject is
People v. Lochner.28 The prevailing opinion in this case was
written by PARKER, Ch. J.
It involved the constitutionality
of an act regulating hours of labor in bakeries and confectionery establishments. The full text of the act is given in the
opinion. Only a portion of the first section is important here.
It provides that "No employee shall be required or permitted
to work in a biscuit, bread or cake bakery or confectionery
establishment more than sixty hours in any one7 week, or
more than ten hours in any one day, unless," etc. Defendant was convicted of a misdemeanor in violating this act.
In support of the law it was urged that it was enacted to
protect the health and safety of the public by regulating the
sanitary condition of the bakery and confectionery establishments of the state; that therefore it comes within the
police power of the state; that in a business which is
dangerous the state has the right to regulate the hours of
laborthat an employee shall perform in one day or in one
week, and that the law in question affects alike all persons
similarly situated, and, therefore, none are unjustly discriminated against.
It was urged against the law that it is void for the reason
that it interferes with the freedom of individuals to enter
into a contract with one another; that it can not be upheld
as a proper exercise of the police power under a claim
that it is a health measure; that there is no reasonable
connection with it and the public health, and finally that
bakers are unjustly discriminated against.
An important question was' squarely before the court.
Was the police power of the state so far above the fundamental law of the land, state and national, that any and all
kinds of sumptuary legislation might claim its protection?
The manifest ulterior purpose of the act in question was to
Cooley.
= (1904)
"

Cons. Lir. ('lth Ed.),
177 N. Y. 145. 160.

889.
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raise the value of wages and increase the demand for
labor. This may be a very proper thing to do, but how far
it can be done through legislation without doing violence
to the constitutional freedom of contract is the whole question. Certainly it ought not to be done under the guise of
public health when no question of public health is involved.
The so-called ten-hour law was sustained by a divided
court. PARKER, Ch.J., speaking for the majority, held the act
"is an exercise of the police power of the Legislature relating to the public health, and therefore violates no provision of the state or Federal Constitution." This opinion
is based mainly on The Slaughter House Cases,29 the Laundry
Case,30 and the Eight-Hour Law Case,3 1 in the Supreme Court
of the United States and referred to above. Each one of
these cases is based on a well recognized ground involving the
public health and not simply the health of the individual as a
party to a contract, except possibly the Laundry Case, which
did not affect directly the right of contract at all. The
learned Chief Justice's views are concurred in by GRAY, VANN
and HAIGHT, JJ., the two former writing opinions. JUSTICE
VANN quotes at length from the writings of scientists to show
that work in bake houses is not healthful, as for example,
"The inhalation of impure air in occupations associated
with a very dusty atmosphere renders the lungs less capable
(Osler's Practice of Medicine,
of resisting infection."
269.)32 If every scientific fact so simple and elementary as
this may be made use of in support of paternal legislation
under the police power of the state, there will soon be left
very little freedom of action to the individual.
To the judgment of the court O'BRIEN and"BARTLETT, JJ.,
write dissenting opinions. MARTIN, J., concurs with them.
O'BRIEN, J., in speaking of the police power of the state,
says in this case: "The legislature may not under the guise
of a statute to protect some wrong, real or.imaginary, arbitrarily strike down private rights and invade personal
freedom or confiscate private property." * * * "When it
is manifest, as it is in this case, that the law has no relation
to the subject of health, and that its real object and purpose was to regulate the hours of labor between master and
servant in a business which is private and not dangerous
to morals, or to health, freedom to contract with each other,
(1872)

83 U.

S. 36.

(1884) 113 U. S. 27.
, (1897) 169 U. S. 366.
(1904) 177 N. Y. 172.
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defining their mutual obligations, can not
be prohibited
'
33
without violating the fundamental law.
BARTLETT, J., in his dissenting, declines to take seriously
the unhealthy condition of bakeries. He insists that the
grinding of steel in needle factories and working in underground mines is "not to be confounded with the avocation
of the family baker engaged in the necessary and highly
appreciated labor of producing bread, pies, cake and other
commodities, more calculated to cause dyspepsia in the consumer than consumption in the manufacturer."
Again,
"The country miller of fifty year§ ago who passed a long
and happy life amid the hum of machinery and the grinding process of the upper and nether stones, little dreamed
of a coming day when the legislature, in the full panoply
of paternalism, would rescue his successor from the appalling dangers of the life he led until old age summoned
him to retire." This is not argument, but the best way
after all to unmask a pretense is by ridicule and it is the
only way where a major premise does not admit of serious
consideration.
This case was taken to the Supreme Court of the United
States on error and the decision of the New York court
was reversed on the ground that the statute in question was
an unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of contract. 34
The opinion of the court was 'delivered by Mr. JUSTICE
PECKHAM. Mr. JUSTICE HARLAN wrote a dissenting opinion,
concurred in by Mr. JUSTICE WHITE and Mr. JUSTICE DAY.
Mr. JUSTICE HOLMES also wrote a dissenting opinion. Mr.
JUSTICE PECKHAM in the prevailing opinion said: "We think
the limit of the police power has been reached and passed
in this case. There is, in our judgment, no reasonable
foundation for holding this to be necessary or appropriate
as a health law to safeguard the public health, or the
health of the individuals who are following the trade of a
baker. If this statute be valid, and if, therefore, a proper case is
made out in which to deny the right of an individual,
sui juris, as employer or employee, to make contracts for the
labor of the latter under the protection of the provisions
of the Federal Constitution, there would seem to be no
length to which legislation of this nature might not go. * *
* "It might be safely affirmed that almost all occupations
more or less affect the health. There must be more than
the mere fact of the possible existence of some small amount
"
"

(1904) 17 N. Y. 183, dissenting opinion by O'BRIEN J.
Decided April 17, 1905.
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of unhealthiness to warrant legislative interference with
liberty. It is unfortunately true that labor, even in any
department, may possibly carry with it the seeds of unhealthiness. But are we all, on that account, at the mercy
of legislative majorities?"35
The learned justice, after calling attention to the various
occupations that might be brought under the control of
the legislature if the law were sustained, copcludes, saying:
"We do not believe in the soundness of the views which uphold this law. On the contrary we think that such a law
as this, although passed in the assumed exercise of the
police power, and as relating to the public health, or the
health of the employees named, is not within that power,
and is invalid. The act is not, within any fair meaning of
the term, a health law, but is an illegal interference with
the right of individuals, both employers and employees,
to make contracts regarding labor upon such terms as they
may think best, or which they may agree upon with the
other parties to such contracts."
After calling attention to the fact that the interference
on the part of the legislatures of the several states with the
ordinary trades and occupations of the people seems to be
on the increase, Mr. JUSTICE PECKHAM adds: "It is impossible
for us to shut our eyes to the fact that many of the laws
of this character, while passed under what is claimed to
be the police power for the purpose of protecting the public
health or welfare, are, in reality, passed from other motives.
We are justified in saying so when, from the character of
the law and the subjeet upon which it legislates, it is apparent that the public health or welfare bears but the most
remote relation to the law. The purpose of a statute must
be determined from the natural and legal effect of the
language employed; and whether it is or is not repugnant
to the Constitution of the United States must be determined
from the natural effect of-such statutes when put into operation, and not from their proclaimed purpose. The court
looks beyond the mere letter of the law in such cases." 3
If the Supreme Court of the United States continues to
look beyond the proclaimed purpose of a law and to judge
of its constitutionality from the manifest motives for its
enactment, there will be found in a few years much waste
paper in the statute laws of our several states. Nothing
z Lochner v. State, in U.

S. Supreme Court, decided April 17, 1905.

3 Citing Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313; Brimmer v. Rebman. 138 U. S. 78;
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356.
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is better known than that a large part of the paternal legislation of recent years, relating to the ordinary callings in
life, has been enacted and defended on one pretended purpose or another when the real purpose and effect of the law
are in violation of the letter and spirit of the Federal Constitution.
Mr. JUSTICE HARLAN, in a dissenting opinion, in the Lochner
Case, said: "It is plain that this statute was enacted in order
to protect the physical well being of those who work in
bakery and confectionery establishments."
After having
suggested that there might have been an utlterior object, he
said further: "Be this as it may, the statute must be taken
as expressing the belief of the people of New York that, as
a general rule, and in the case of the average man, labor in
excess of sixty hours during a week in such establishments
may endanger the health of those who thus labor. Whether
or not this be wise legislation is not the province of the court
to inquire. Under our system of government the courts are
not concerned with the wisdom or policy of legislation."
The prevailing opinion is in effect that the court will inquire into the policy of legislation far enough to ascertain
whether its purpose and effect are, in reality, to evade and
defeat those constitutional guarantees intended for the benefit of 7the individual as against unjust legislation by the
state
JEROME C. KNOWLTON.
University of Michigan.

" See State v. Dodge (Vt.).
56 Atl. R. 983, holding the "Anti Trading Stamp Law"
of Vermont an unconstitutional interference with the right of the citizen to contract.
People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 389.

